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Abstract. In classical interpretation, health is defined as a subjective right to this intangible 
good, which is only characteristic of humans. However, it could be evaluated whether health 
as a relevant interest can be characteristic of any other subject, expanding the existing 
understanding of health. The modern legal system distinguishes between subjects with 
different levels of protection of their interests, i.e., the subjects of rights and the subjects of 
interests. And a trend is observed where health is also recognised as a category characteristic 
of the subjects of interests, adjusting the former understanding of the concept of health. Thus, 
by expanding the understanding of health, types of health can be distinguished according to 
the subject of interests, e.g., health of a legal person, health of a conceived person, etc., 
adapting the understanding of health to the criteria of the subject of interests. The research 
aim is to analyse the expansion of the understanding of health and suggest a division of the 
types of health in accordance with the modern legal system. The following primary research 
methods were used in the study: analytical, systemic, teleological. 





In classical interpretation, health is defined as a subjective right to this 
intangible good, which is only characteristic of humans. However, nowadays, 
when the legal system is becoming more nuanced, directions for the expansion 
of the understanding of health are emerging which do not attribute health 
exclusively to humans. 
From the analysis of the processes in the legal system, a characteristic 
category is observed for specific subjects of interests, which shows elements of 
the notion of health. Thus, types of health can be distinguished according to the 
subject of interests, thus expanding the understanding of health. 
The Latvian legal system demonstrates clashes between the legal science, 
normative regulation and case law concerning the groundwork on the types of 
health. We need to create a uniform approach to the understanding and types of 
health, ensuring proper functioning of the legal system. 
 







The research aim is to analyse the expansion of the understanding of health 
and suggest a division of the types of health in accordance with the modern legal 
system. The following primary research methods were used in the study: 




Literature, laws and regulations and legal practice materials were used in the 
research process. From the evaluation of the sources, it can be concluded that no 
comprehensive research on the types of health is found. The sources only outline 




Special legal science research methods were used in the research process: 





Health as a relevant interest is protected. The legal system distinguishes 
between subjects with different levels of protection of their interests. Interest is a 
particular good of the subject, where three types of interest are distinguished: 
first, legally irrelevant interests, which have no legal protection; second, legally 
relevant interests, which are protected by law; third, subjective rights, where the 
legal norm includes significant interests, also creating a legal obligation for 
another person (Ten Haaf, 2017, pp.1108-1110; Mullins, 2019, p.96; Paul, 2007, 
pp.720-725; Kelch, 1999). And following this division of interests, subjects of 
rights and subjects of interests can be distinguished (Ten Haaf, 2017, p.1108). 
Thus, the specific scope of interests of the subjects of rights are characterized by 
absolute legal protection, where the legal protection of a previously undefined 
scope of interests of the subjects of interests depends on the ability to justify the 
significance of such interests, acquiring a relative character of legal protection. 
Interests exist independently from the state, where the state chooses which 
interests to protect (interest theory, Ihering) (Law Insider, 2020, pp.639-640). 
And it is not implausible that a currently irrelevant interest with time can acquire 
the character of a legally protected interest, with the change of value criteria in 
society. Undeniably, health is an important good, which falls within the content 
of any interest, including subjective rights and relevant interests. 
This raises the question – what subjects have interests? First, it is 
determined that things cannot have interests (Ten Haaf, 2017, p.1115). Second, 
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criteria for determining the subjects of interests are offered and evaluated – 
identifiability of the subject, the ability to feel, its conative life, as well as the 
subject’s obligatory emergence in the future if it does not yet exist (Ten Haaf, 
2017, p.1114, 1116, 1118, 1119; Campbell, 2017). The analysis of these criteria 
results in, on the one hand, primary criteria for determining the subject of 
interests and establishing its legal status (identifiability, emergence at least in the 
future); on the other hand – additional criteria for weighing the importance of 
the subject of interests and expanding its legal status (ability to feel, conative 
life). It can thus be concluded that the subject of interests has no legal status of 
the subject of rights, and the legal status of the subject of interests is comprised 
of criteria with rather broad interpretation. Still, the subjects of interests have 
interests. And it can be evaluated whether health as a relevant interest in this 
intangible good can be characteristic of any other subject, expanding the existing 
understanding of health as a subjective right to this intangible good only 
characteristic of humans. 
It is arguable whether a legal person has a relevant interest in health as an 
intangible good. Until now, a principle has been established that a legal person 
could not have an intangible good that is only characteristic of a natural person 
(LR Augstākās tiesas Judikatūras un zinātniski analītiskā nodaļa, 2019, 3.1.pk.; 
European Court of Human rights, 2011, point 22), and health was consolidated 
as only characteristic of humans. However, the significance of the prevalent 
theory that recognises real existence of a legal person and attributes the same 
qualities to it as to a natural person (Čakste, 2017, 41.lpp.) is nowadays growing. 
A trend is observed in the legal system where legal entities are more widely 
recognised as subjects with personality (Mazure, 2014, 103.lpp.; Rozenbergs, 
2003; Krimināllikums, 1998, VIII.1.nod.; Krons, 1940; Civillikums, 1992a, 
387.p.; Civillikums, 1993a, 1635.p.; Bitāns, 2006). It is also stated that a legal 
person can also have intangible goods (LR Augstākās tiesas Senāta Civillietu 
departaments, 2019; LR Augstākās tiesas Senāta Civillietu departaments, 2008; 
LR Augstākās tiesas Judikatūras un zinātniski analītiskā nodaļa, 2019, 3.1.pk.), 
only the understanding of intangible good of a natural and legal person is 
different (LR Augstākās tiesas Judikatūras un zinātniski analītiskā nodaļa, 2019, 
3.1.pk.; European Court of Human rights, 2011, point 22). Also, intangible 
goods of legal persons have already been discussed in the legal science as 
having the characteristics of the criterion of health –as an effective course of all 
processes, i.e., achieving goals and wellbeing of employees in the work 
environment (Xenidis & Theocharous, 2014, pp.563-565). Thus, a trend is 
observed promoting the recognition of health for legal persons as well, adapting 
the understanding of health to the principle of a legal person. The health of a 
legal person is defined as its internal organisational functioning, which also 
affects the wellbeing of its employees, as well as the ability to undertake the 
 







civil obligations, to develop and reach its goals in society. Despite the fact that a 
legal person is the subject of rights in civil-law relations, it is characterised by 
health as a relevant interest of a subject of interests, which is not yet secured in 
the normative regulation. 
Traditionally, health is understood as an intangible good characteristic of 
humans. However, this understanding is narrowed down by attributing health to 
a specific period of the person’s development, i.e., from the person’s birth until 
their death. Such an approach is justified by the fact that a person’s legal 
capacity appears at birth, and legal relevance appears by mere fact of birth, 
which is proven by the registration of the fact in the registry of births 
(Civillikums, 1993a, 1406.p.; Torgāns et al., 1998, 20.lpp.; Civil Code, 1804, 
a.16; Civilstāvokļa aktu reģistrācijas likums, 2012, V nod.; LR Augstākās tiesas 
Senāta Administratīvo lietu departaments, 2006; LR Administratīvā 
apgabaltiesa, 2007); and legal capacity ends with death – the death of the brain 
(Kārtība, kādā veicama smadzeņu un bioloģiskās nāves fakta konstatēšana un 
miruša cilvēka nodošana apbedīšanai, 2007, 2.-7.pk.) or presumption of death, 
when the person is legally declared dead (Civillikums, 1993b, 377., 378.p.; 
Civilprocesa likums, 1998, 286.p.2., 3.d.). Thus, health is only attached to the 
legal capacity period of the person as a subject of rights rather than the person’s 
entire period of life. 
However, there is a period of a person’s life when health is not directly 
attributed to a person in a legal sense. This is the situation of a conceived but yet 
unborn person (“nasciturus” – “that shall hereafter be born” (Grimm, 2003, 
66 s.), “conceptus” – “conceived” (Sanfillipo, 2002, 38 s.)). A person is 
considered to be conceived from the fusion of gametes until the human being is 
born, when the baby has fully detached from the mother’s flesh, creating 
parallels with natural appearance of fruit at the moment of detachment, where 
the cutting of the umbilical cord is not an obligatory prerequisite (Mazure, 2014, 
66.lpp.; Balodis, 2007, 74., 75.lpp.; Kennedy & Grubb, 1998, p.190; Larenz & 
Wolf, 1997, S.123; Civillikums, 1992b, 856.p.). Ambiguity lies in the following 
circumstance. On the one hand, a conceived human being is not recognised as 
the subject of rights because this human being does not have a legally 
recognised legal personality in a broad sense (Kennedy & Grubb, 1998, p.190). 
On the other hand, however, some rights of a conceived person are still 
protected (for example, a conceived person has a recognised capacity to inherit 
(Civillikums, 1992a, 386.p.), parents can appoint guardians for their expected 
children in a testament (Civillikums, 1993b, 223.p.1.d.) etc.), but the normative 
regulation does not specify or give a general approach – what type of rights are 
protected and what the scope of this protection is. 
Nowadays, a trend is observed in the change of approach regarding the 
connection between a conceived person and health. On the one hand, a 
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conceived person at this point is considered an integral part of the mother’s body 
until detachment, because substances required for sustaining life and 
development are received through the mother, making the conceived person 
completely dependent on the expectant mother (Kennedy & Grubb, 1998, p.189, 
193). On the other hand, the legal science sees an increasingly convincing 
opinion that a conceived person is not to be seen as part of the expectant 
mother’s body. Two main arguments are made: 1) a conceived person is 
genetically unique (McHale, Fox, & Murphy, 1997, p.705; Liholaja, 2004, 
28.lpp.) and thus different from the expectant mother’s genetic characterization; 
2) unlike an expectant mother’s body part, the embryo develops into a being 
which is able to exist independently, i.e., the “potentiality argument” (J.Harris) 
(Liholaja, 2004, 28.lpp.; Sīlis, 2006, 106.lpp.). Thus, premises are found for the 
expansion of the understanding and scope of the protection of rights of a 
conceived person. 
Considering that a conceived person is not a legally irrelevant fact 
(Schulman, 2013, p.11, 12), attempts have been observed to recognise health as 
characteristic of a conceived person too. Two approaches emerge. First, the 
protection of the rights of a conceived person is included in the legal personality 
of their parents (Robinson, 2018, p.25, 26; Campbell, 2017) where the health of 
a conceived person is defined as a protected interest of the parents. Second, the 
health of a conceived person is valued as an independent protected interest 
where the protection of the health of a conceived person follows from their right 
to life, considering the close interrelation, albeit with a different scope of the 
protection of the right to life for born and unborn persons (Eiropas Cilvēktiesību 
un pamatbrīvību aizsardzības konvencija, 1950, 2.p.1.d.; LR Satversme, 1993, 
93.p.; Bundesverfassungsgericht des Deutschlands, 1975; Bundesverfassungsge-
richt des Deutschlands, 1993). Influenced by these approaches and the 
opportunities provided by medical science, the normative regulation provides for 
medical treatment of a conceived person (Ministru Kabinets, 2018; Simič, 2018, 
p.256, 257), i.e., improvement of the health of a conceived person. Thus, the 
legal practice attempts to protect the health of a conceived person using derived 
legal reasoning, supporting the understanding of health as being characteristic of 
a conceived person as well.  
The modern legal system needs to specify and formalise the legal status of 
a conceived person and the understanding of their health in the context of 
medical treatment. Although a conceived person is not a subject of rights in 
accordance with the existing principles of legal capacity, still they correspond to 
the features of a subject of interests. This is also reinforced by two processes 
observed in the legal system. First, a future person is discussed, which has not 
been conceived yet but could be conceived in the future, seeing them as a 
subject of interests and even trying to protect them in the normative regulation 
 







(Ten Haaf, 2017, p.1104, 1106; Ten Haaf, 2016, p.1, 14) (e.g., in the German 
Civil Code when setting limits for proxyconsent to sterilisation of a patient, the 
interests of a yet unconceived person are also taken into account (Civil Code, 
1896, § 1905(1)). Second, an opinion has been expressed that following the 
principle of symmetry of logic (Dmitriev et al., 2006, s.130) one criterion needs 
to exist which can be used to determine the moment of emergence and 
termination of a person as a subject of rights. If the criterion used to determine 
the death of a person is brain death (Kārtība, kādā veicama smadzeņu un 
bioloģiskās nāves fakta konstatēšana un miruša cilvēka nodošana apbedīšanai, 
2007, 2.-7.pk.), then the beginning of life should be the moment when the brain 
starts functioning, i.e., at the 6th week of embryonic development (Apinis, 1998, 
732., 733.lpp.), which can be medically observed. And the health possessed by 
the conceived person is to be valued as an independent relevant interest of the 
subject of interests. If we take into account that according to the direction of 
implementation of health, a person’s health is divided into internal health, i.e., 
the ability to perform the function of life and the bodily and mental functions 
medically related to it; and external health, i.e., the ability to socialise and 
individually fulfil oneself (Mazure, 2020, p.45), then a conceived person can 
only have internal health, adapting the understanding of health to the principles 
of a conceived person. Thus, the health of a conceived person can be defined as 
proper functioning of the cells, tissues, and organs, which ensures its viability. 
When evaluating the understanding of health, it can be found that 
nowadays health is also explained from the point of view of the interests of 
society, recognising health as a category characteristic of society. Considering 
that society in general can have interests and even rights, the sense of public 
health is also used, which denotes the health of society (Paul, 2007; Kramer, 
2016; Atbrecht, Higginbotham, Connor, & Ellis, 2017; Müller, Ganten, & 
Larisch, 2014, S.A1900; Shevchenko, 2004, s.267). Thus health is understood 
not only as a private good characteristic of a specific individual subject, but also 
as a public good (Müller, Ganten, & Larisch, 2014, S.A1901; Büchs, & Koch, 
2019, p.162; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014, p.1) characteristic 
of a specific set of subjects. And as soon as this set of subjects can be identified, 
it is a recognised category characteristic of this set, which has the features of 
health. 
The definition of public health is derived from the types of public health, 
which highlight its most significant, interrelated principles. Firstly, according to 
the scope of the members of the set of subjects, public health is divided into the 
health of all society (see: Epidemioloģiskās drošības likums, 1997, 3.p.1.d.8.pk.; 
Svalastog, Donev, Kristoffersen, & Gajovič, 2017) and the health of a specific 
social group (see: Freeman, 1961, p.278; Welfare, 2019; Lock, Last, & Dunea, 
2006; The Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion, 1986), which is characteristic 
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of at least two subjects in a mutual relationship and describes these subjects as 
an aggregate. Secondly, according to the direction of implementation of health, 
public health is divided into internal health of the set of subjects, which is the 
sum of individual health of separate subjects of the set, and into external health 
of the set of subjects, because the features of the set are not related exclusively 
to the features of its members (Freeman, 1961, p.278; Shevchenko et al., 2004, 
c.273) and in the set of subjects external health describes the quality of its 
existence and development, as well as the quality of interaction between its 
subjects. Thus, public health can be defined as the effectiveness of relationships 
of a social group or the members of the whole society and their mutual 
interaction, which describes the organisation and development of a social group 
or society, also including the sum of individual health of the members of 
specific social groups or the whole society. 
Nowadays a direction is observed where health is also recognised as a 
category characteristic of animals, expanding the existing understanding of 
health. And the legal evaluation of the idea of animal health is carried out. 
On the one hand, based on the normative regulation, an animal is a live 
physical thing which belongs to an owner or can be an unowned thing, for 
example, a wild animal (Civillikums, 1992b, 841., 842.p.1.d., 931., 932.-935.p.; 
Civillikums, 1993a, 2365.p.; Grūtups et al., 1996, 23.lpp.; Rozenfelds, 2000, 
96.lpp.; Sinaiskis, 1996, 235.lpp.; Torgāns et al., 1998, 643., 644.lpp.), and an 
animal cannot be a participant in legal relations and has neither rights nor 
obligations (Torgāns, 2014, 515.lpp.; Sinaiskis, 1996, 29.lpp.). Thus, normative 
regulation does not provide for the relevant interest of an animal in health as an 
intangible good. 
However, on the other hand, regardless of the philosophical attempts to 
single out the superior status of a human being due to its unique ability to value 
its life and create the future based on reason and free will (Sīlis, 2006, 111., 
113., 114.lpp.; Kūle&Kūlis, 1996, 628.lpp.), nowadays the legal meaning of 
animals is growing. This can be justified as follows. Human beings are not 
owners of other beings but constitute only one of these beings (Dibifē, 1992, 
19.lpp.), and all live things, based on the extended interpretation of natural 
rights, have the right to equality (Ulpian) (Jevola) and the right to respect 
(I.Kant) (Kelch, 1999). And special legal categories are growing in the legal 
systems, i.e., the importance of animals, granting them a certain legal status and 
valuing it higher than a thing (Kūle & Kūlis, 1996, 631.lpp.; Callicott, 1980, 
p.311). This is why it is recognised that animals have interests (Campbell, 2017; 
Jackson, 2013, p.625) and their specific rights can be determined, rather than 
only regulating human behaviour in society for the protection of animals 
(Čakste, 19XX, 12., 13.lpp.) – the right not to be a property, the right to life, the 
right to be respected (Svece, 2019), the right to be free from pain (Kelch, 1999). 
 







Thus, prerequisites are formed in the legal system for the expansion of the 
understanding of animal status. 
The situation is disputable – while the basic principles of the legal meaning 
of animals are still discussed within the legal system, animal health is already 
protected by normative regulation. The idea of the protection of animal health is 
enshrined at the international (Global Animal Law Association, 2018; World 
Organisation for animal health, 2015, s.6), the European (The European 
Parliament and of the Council, 2016; The European Parliament and of the 
Council, 2010), and the national level (Dzīvnieku aizsardzības likums, 1999, 
Preambula, 5.p.1.d., 2.d.2.pk., 7.p.; Veterinārmedicīnas likums, 2001, 1.p.7.pk., 
15.p.1.d., 2.d.; Animal health act, 1981; Animal health protection, 1926; Animal 
health act, 2014; Animal health act, 2009; Animal health and protection act, 
1989; Animal health act, 1988; Animal health act, 2010), having also created for 
this purpose the World Organisation for Animal Health, which consists of 181 
member countries (The World Organisation for Animal Health, 2020) and 
having recognised from ancient times the existence of one medicine for people 
and animals, which also includes veterinary medicine (Zinsstag, Schelling, 
Waltner-Toews, & Tanner, 2011, p.149). Attempts have also been observed to 
define animal health as an individual condition which includes physical, mental, 
and social factors and which is aimed at coping with pathologies (Global Animal 
Law Association, 2018), and where this definition has been created as an 
analogy to the current definition of human health. 
The arguments show that in the modern legal system animals are 
recognised as subjects of interests where their status already outweighs only the 
characteristics of a thing but cannot yet be legally equated to the status of the 
subject of rights, and an animals’ relevant interest – health – is crucial to its life 
and survival. Animal health can be defined as an analogy to human health, 
adapting this definition to the understanding of an animal. Thus, animal health 
can be explained as proper functioning of the animal’s organs, which ensures its 
ability to live and the ability to adapt to the ecosystem (to survive), also 
considering the impact (both positive and negative) of society on the ecosystem.  
Here emerges another expansion of the understanding of health, attributing 
health to the ecosystem. An ecosystem is a functional system which includes 
populations found within a specific territory and the inanimate environment of 
their existence (Baldunčiks & Pokrotniece, 1999, 180.lpp.). The terms used in 
the normative regulation – “rehabilitation of natural resources”, “environmental 
quality” (Vides aizsardzības likums, 2006, 1.p.15.pk., 2.p.1.d.), “environmental 
health” (Epidemioloģiskās drošības likums, 1997, 3.p.1.d.1.pk.) – leading to 
believe that the health of the ecosystem (nature) is implied. 
Ecosystem health is related to animal and public health, which manifests in 
two ways. On the one hand, ecosystem health is separate from animal health 
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(Huffman, 1992, p.55; Callicott, 1988, p.164), which is a category of separate 
natural elements; and ecosystem health is separate from public health, where 
both together form the health of the planet (Prescott & Logan, 2019, p.102; 
Callicott, 1988, p.164). It is noteworthy that initially in Ancient times nature and 
society were viewed as a whole, where human beings were part of nature, 
blending with it; in the Medieval Period, with the consolidation of religion and 
its principle that nature was created by God, the importance of a human being 
had grown, and people separated themselves from nature; and nowadays people 
contrast themselves with nature on the basis of the power of technology 
available to them (Kūle & Kūlis, 1996, 629., 630.lpp.). Thus, the relationship 
between nature and society has a growing split, which is confirmed by the 
historical development of this relationship. 
On the other hand, ecosystem health is interrelated with public health 
where two aspects can be emphasised. First, the health of the ecosystem and 
society have a mutual effect on each other, where society does certain harm to 
the health of the ecosystem (Kruse, 2019; Prescott & Logan, 2019, p.99; 
Zinsstag et al., 2011, p.150, 151, 153; Callicott, 1980, p.325; Bambra, Smith, & 
Pearce, 2019, p.36; Albrecht et al., 2017; Rapport, 1989; Tountas, 2009, p.191), 
unlike the ecosystem in relation to society. Thus, society has an obligation to 
preserve, protect, and restore the ecosystem (Rio Declaration on environment 
and development, 1992, Pr.7). And second, health of the ecosystem is 
independent from society (Rapport, 1989), whereas the opposite cannot be 
stated. It can thus be concluded that ecosystem health has formed and 
consolidated as a separate and independent category.  
To evaluate the legal nature of the ecosystem, it is recognised as a subject 
of interests, considering its independence. This approach is also indirectly 
supported by the principle that existence and preservation of the ecosystem is in 
the interest of the next generations of society (Büchs & Koch, 2019, p.155, 163; 
Callicott, 1988, p.163). There is a fascinating and unprecedented case when a 
river as a separate element of nature was even granted the legal status of a 
subject of rights with a set of rights, obligations and responsibility as recognition 
of the moral value of that specific river for those specific peoples –the Maori (Te 
Awa Tupua Act, 2017, s.12; Kurki, 2019, p.1, 3, 11). Although such practice, 
most likely, is not supported in the legal system, it still supports the growing 
trend of the legal meaning of the ecosystem in the modern day. 
There have been several attempts to define ecosystem health, which is 
difficult, in order to achieve a comprehensive result. Important principles of 
attempted definition can be noted, which have been included in the definition of 
the ecosystem – good condition of the environment (Kruse, 2019), a good 
functioning system (Burkhard, Müller, & Lill, 2008), activity of the ecosystem, 
organisation and adaptability according to objective scientific criteria (Lu et al., 
 







2015; Rapport, 1995), ability to solve problems (Rumpelsberger, 2012, S.18). 
Thus, ecosystem health can be defined as the quality condition of nature 
assessed according to science-based criteria, as well as a mutually functioning 
system of the elements of nature aimed at the existence, preservation, and 
regeneration of the ecosystem. 
Thus, health is understood in a broader sense, not only as an intangible 
good characteristic of humans, and the reasons for the expansion of such 
understanding are aimed in three directions – a more nuanced legal 
understanding of a human being, attribution of human features to social 
formations, and the growth of the legal meaning of the ecosystem and its 
elements, which leads to the idea of the types of health. 
 
Research Results and Conclusions 
 
1. Regardless of the fact that health is described as a subjective right to 
this intangible good characteristic only of humans, nowadays directions for the 
expansion of the understanding of human health are emerging which do not 
relate it exclusively to humans. For specific subjects of interests, a category 
characteristic of them can be established, which has the features of the notion of 
health. 
2. With the legal system becoming more nuanced, types of health can be 
distinguished according to the subject of interests they describe, thus expanding 
the understanding of health. When giving a definition of the health of a subject 
of interests, it has to be adapted to the principles of the understanding of that 
specific subject of interests. 
3. Apart from human health, the following other types of health can be 
distinguished: 1) health of a legal person; 2) health of a conceived person; 
3) public health; 4) animal health; 5) ecosystem health. Each type of health is 
given a definition, which is included in the suggested draft section of the 
normative regulation. 
The Medical Treatment Law is to be supplemented with Section 32 as 
follows: 
“Section 32.  
(1) The health of a legal person is the functioning of its internal 
organisation, which also affects the wellbeing of its employees, as well 
as the ability to undertake the civil obligations, develop and reach its 
goals in society. 
(2) The health of a conceived person means proper functioning of its cells, 
tissues, and organs, which ensures its viability. 
(3) Public health is the effectiveness of relationships of a social group or 
the members of the whole society and their mutual interaction, which 
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describes the organisation and development of a social group or 
society, also including the sum of individual health of the members of a 
specific social group or the whole society. 
(4) Animal health means proper functioning of the organs of the animal, 
which ensures its ability to live and the ability to adapt to the 
ecosystem, also considering the impact of society on the ecosystem. 
(5) Ecosystem health is the quality condition of nature assessed according 
to science-based criteria, as well as a mutually functioning system of 
the elements of nature aimed at the existence, preservation, and 
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